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Abstract 
Objective Health IT (HIT) systems are increasingly becoming a core infrastructural 
technology in healthcare. However, failures of these systems, under certain conditions, can 
lead to patient harm and as such the safety case for HIT has to be explicitly made. This 
study focuses on safety assurance practices of HIT in England and investigates how 
clinicians and engineers currently analyse, control and justify HIT safety risks. 
Methods Three workshops were organised, involving 34 clinical and engineering 
stakeholders, and centred on predefined risk-based questions. This was followed by a 
detailed review of the Clinical Safety Case Reports for 20 different national and local 
systems. The data generated was analysed thematically, considering the clinical, 
engineering and organisational factors, and was used to examine the often implicit safety 
argument for HIT. 
Results Two areas of strength were identified: establishment of a systematic approach to 
risk management and close engagement by clinicians; and two areas for improvement: 
greater depth and clarity in hazard analysis practices and greater organisational support for 
assuring safety. Overall, the dynamic characteristics of healthcare combined with insufficient 
funding have made it challenging to generate and explain the safety evidence to the required 
level of detail and rigour. 
Conclusion  Improvements in the form of practical HIT-specific safety guidelines and tools 
are needed. The lack of publicly available examples of credible HIT safety cases is a major 
deficit. The availability of these examples can help clarify the significance of the HIT risk 
analysis evidence and identify the necessary expertise and organisational commitments. 
Keywords: Health Information Technology; Patient Safety; Risk; Hazard; Safety Case. 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Health Information Technology (HIT) systems are increasingly categorised as safety 
critical since failures of these systems, under certain conditions, can lead to patient harm 
[1-4]. As a result, different national reviews have encouraged health systems and health 
services to consider, and where appropriate adapt, practices in other high-risk sectors, 
particularly aviation [10], which adopt systematic approaches to risk management [11-
12]. This typically includes the implementation of a proactive safety management 
system, generation of a safety case and hazard log and institutionalisation of an open 
safety culture [13].  
In England, the National Health Service (NHS) has been promoting and supporting such 
approaches for HIT safety assurance [14], through a dedicated Clinical Safety Team at 
NHS Digital. NHS Digital is a public body within the Department of Health that is 
responsible for providing data and IT systems for commissioners, analysts and clinicians 
in health and social care. Two safety standards, targeting HIT manufactures (SCCI0129 
[15]) and health organisations (SCCI0160 [16]), have been issued by the 
Standardisation Committee for Care Information on behalf of NHS England. The NHS 
standards specify normative requirements, supported by informative guidance, for the 
implementation of a risk management process, including safety incident management, 
and demonstration of organisational commitments. These standards mandate the 
appointment of Clinical Safety Officers (CSOs), who, in their capacity as experienced 
clinicians, are expected to lead the HIT risk management activities.  
While the NHS safety standards for HIT provide risk management requirements and 
guidelines, it is unclear how they should be approached and implemented in practice. 
Even in safety-critical industries, there is considerable debate about the practical 
problems with common risk assessment principles, such as the definition of risk or 
decisions about acceptability of risk [59] [60] [61]. In healthcare, these practical problems 
are exacerbated by the different organisational and cultural contexts. Failure to 
appreciate and properly understand these differences can lead to unsatisfactory 
adoption and frustration, and even threaten patient safety [62] [63].       
This paper aims to analyse the practice of HIT safety assurance practices in England, as 
scoped by the SCCI0160 and SCCI0160 standards. The paper focuses on how 
practitioners interpret and implement the risk management activities defined in the 
standards and describes the uncertainties and practical problems they encounter. By 
understanding these uncertainties and problems, clinicians, engineers and safety 
assessors can proactively act on potential human, organisational and technical failures 
and latent faults, particularly during the HIT design and deployment stages, before they 
transform into hazardous events or result in patient harm. The insights into the practice 
of HIT risk management will be helpful in determining recommendations for improving 
existing standards, guidance, and practical implementation. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the published literature on 
HIT and patient safety and highlight the importance of the socio-technical dimensions of 
assuring the safety of HIT. In Section 3, we introduce our research question and explain 
our research proposition, which is based on the risk-based safety argument on which the 
SCCI0160 and SCCI0160 standards are centred. In Section 4, we describe the 
qualitative research methods that we used to evaluate the extent to which our 
proposition is supported by evidence from current HIT risk management practices in 
England. In Section 5, we present our results in terms of overarching safety assurance 
themes and detailed findings that relate to the different stages in the HIT risk 
management process. In Sections 6 and 7, we discuss the implications of our results 
and present our conclusions and areas for further work.  
2 THE IMPACT OF HIT ON PATIENT SAFETY Ð A 
CONTROVERSIAL EVIDENCE BASE 
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that approximately 1 in 10 hospitalised 
patients experience harm [44]. At least 50% of these experiences are preventable. In the 
United States for example, adverse medical events are the third leading cause of death 
[46]. In low-income and middle-income countries, WHO estimates that around two-thirds 
of all adverse events happen in these regions [44]. Given the scale of this problem, 
ensuring patient safety is now both a national and global concern. 
Vincent defines patient safety as the Òavoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse 
outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of healthcareÓ [43]. Technology, 
combined with improved patient engagement, has played a key role in improving and 
even redefining the boundary of patient safety to the extent that many types of harm that 
were seen as inevitable in the past, e.g. healthcare-associated infections, are now 
regarded as preventable [7]. 
One of these technologies is HIT, which has the potential to improve patient safety but 
also introduce new hazards [3]. For example, Electronic Prescribing can help eliminate 
transcription errors in a paper-based process but also increase risk by inducing unsafe 
shortcuts and alert fatigue [49] [50] [51]. HIT is a broad domain, and the existing 
literature on the impact of the different aspects of HIT on patient safety is both extensive 
and controversial [64] [70]. Despite the major investments worldwide in HIT and many 
reports about the positive impact the use of HIT such as Electronic Health Records and 
Computerised Physician Order Entry systems can have [12], there is still a lively debate 
documented in several systematic reviews about the extent to which the available 
evidence supports the claims about the safety benefits of IT in healthcare ([5], [65], [66]).   
The Institute of Medicine released a report looking specifically at the impact of HIT on 
patient safety [3]. The report concluded that the current state of safety and HIT was not 
acceptable. In addition, there is an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that the 
introduction of HIT can lead to unintended consequences, and create opportunities for 
failure, which can have significant adverse effects on patient safety ([67], [68], [68]).    
Black and colleagues found in their systematic review of the impact of HIT on the quality 
and safety of care that many HIT interventions failed to live up to expectations, because 
they did not integrate well into existing clinical processes [5]. Such concerns about the 
consideration of the wider context of HIT implementation have given rise to socio-
technical models, such as the one put forward by Sittig and Singh [8]. In their socio-
technical model, Sittig and Singh identified eight dimensions, namely: (1) hardware and 
software computing infrastructure, (2) clinical content, (3) human-computer interface, (4) 
people, (5) workflow and communication, (6) internal organisational policies, procedures 
and culture, (7) external rules, regulations and pressures and (8) system measurement 
and monitoring [8]. These dimensions are consistent with recent approaches to studying 
patient safety such as the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) 
model [45], in which technologies such as HIT are one of many interacting components. 
Further, the socio-technical nature of HIT failures are systematically classified by 
Magrabi et al [19], highlighting how HIT safety problems emerge from the interweaving 
between human (e.g. cognitive load), organisational (e.g. staffing levels) and 
technological factors (data loss). Further, the importance of these factors have recently 
been emphasised by a review of HIT adoption in England, which was led by Robert 
Wachter and supported by the UK Department of Health and NHS England [54]. The 
review recommendations also called for improved education around HIT for clinicians 
and the need to strengthen the role of Chief Clinical Informatics Officers in hospitals.  
In terms of public policy, in 2012, a review of national HIT safety initiatives concluded 
that such programs Òare at varying different stages of maturity, with England having the 
longest standing and most well developed safety programs, while Canada and the 
United States are at earlier stagesÓ [17]. Recently, a retrospective review of 850 HIT 
events reported to NHS Digital between 2005 and 2011 was performed [18], offering 
further evidence that HIT failures have been hazardous (68% of the events) and were 
associated with patient harm (3% of the events) including 3 deaths. This is consistent 
with reviews of HIT incidents in the US and Australia [19-20]. However, as 
acknowledged by the authors, the study considered a ÒsnapshotÓ of the events, due to 
underreporting [21-22], to allow us to generalise the results and make a decision 
concerning the level of patient safety risk posed by HIT.  
In order to harness the potential benefits that HIT can bring to the safety of care, it is 
important, therefore, to appreciate the clinical processes and the social and cultural 
context within which HIT is introduced. This applies equally to the generic risk 
management principles that have been adopted from other safety-critical industries [11] 
[12]. Sujan and colleagues undertook a consensus development exercise with 
healthcare stakeholders, and found that participants suggested that the concepts of 
safety and risk management were poorly understood in healthcare, and that there was a 
lack of transparency about how decisions about risk management were undertaken [55]. 
In order to improve the practice of HIT risk management, it will be helpful to understand 
how healthcare practitioners make sense of existing risk management principles, and 
the problems that they experience in the application of the recommended HIT safety 
standards.  
3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROPOSITION 
The current literature shows that HIT can have both benefits for patient safety as well as 
introduce new risks. In order to reduce the adverse impact on patient safety resulting 
from the adoption of HIT, standards based on generic risk management principles used 
in safety-critical industries have been developed. What remains unclear is the extent to 
which these risk management principles fit with the healthcare domain, and how 
healthcare stakeholders make sense of them.   
Given the importance of studying HIT safety as a socio-technical topic, as identified from 
the literature review in Section 2, our primary research question is as follows:  
How do clinicians and engineers analyse and justify HIT safety risks, considering the 
socio-technical dimensions of safety assurance? 
That is, this study concerns how the risk management requirements for HIT are 
implemented in practice. Further, the study focuses on how clinicians and engineers 
explain the rationale for, i.e. justify, key decisions in the risk management process, e.g. 
the reasoning for scoping the HIT system and its clinical settings in a particular way and 
the assumptions and basis for choosing particular risk control options and acceptability 
criteria. These decisions are often subjective and qualitative and therefore the underlying 
reasoning and assumptions have to be explicitly communicated. The need for 
justification of residual risks, as discussed in the next sections, is tightly linked with the 
requirement to provide a safety argument for HIT as part of the wider clinical safety 
case. 
In seeking to answer the above question, our aim is to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of current risk management practices for HIT in England, specifically as 
implemented using the two national safety standards SCCI0129 and SCCI0160. In this 
section, we explore the risk management process in these standards (Section 3.1) and 
discuss how they form the basis for our research proposition (Section 3.2).  
3.1 SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 Risk Management Process 
The SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 safety standards follow the risk management principles 
established for medical devices and are consistent with ISO14971 [26]. The overall risk 
management process is depicted Figure 1. The process commences with defining the 
HIT system and its clinical scope. This includes the intended system functionality, e.g. 
prescribing or patient identification, and the specific care setting within which the system 
is deployed. This is followed by identifying the safety hazards posed by HIT. In this 
context, a hazard is defined as Òa potential source of harm to a patientÓ [15], e.g. the 
patient receives more than the intended drug dose. The risk of each hazard is then 
estimated. A risk is defined as the Òcombination of the severity of harm to a patient and 
the likelihood of occurrence of that harmÓ [15], e.g. the likelihood that the patient suffers 
a permanent life-changing incapacity as the result of the drug overdose. Each risk is 
then evaluated against predefined acceptability criteria, e.g. as defined in a risk matrix.  
Next, options are identified and analysed for controlling the risks that are deemed 
unacceptable, e.g. through redundancy and supervision. In the rare case that a risk is 
deemed unacceptable (i.e. given predefined risk thresholds or matrices) and further 
control is not practicable, additional analyses are required to determine if the clinical 
benefits outweigh the residual clinical risk. Otherwise, the project has to be re-appraised. 
Following the implementation and verification of the risk control measures, the 
organisation has to evaluate the outcome of all the risk management activities, i.e. 
whether residual risks can be accepted. The final three activities in the risk management 
emphasise the through-life nature of safety analysis and the importance of reviewing and 
updating the safety evidence during the deployment, use, monitoring and maintenance 
of the HIT system. 
 
Figure 1: SCCI0129/SCCI0160 Risk Management Activities [15] 
It is important to stress the significance of post-deployment monitoring [23] [24], 
particularly in assessing the effectiveness of the risk control measures, based on use 
data, and the on-going identification of any new safety conditions, e.g. hazards that were 
missed in the initial hazard analysis. 
The above risk management activities produce two primary artefacts: Hazard Log (HL) 
and Clinical Safety Case Report (CSCR) [27-28]. The HL is a mechanism for recording 
the on-going identification, analysis and resolution of the HIT hazards and their 
associated risks and controls. The HL essentially defines the evidence base generated 
from the risk management process, i.e. the data generated from risk analysis, evaluation 
and control as depicted in Figure 1. Since the evidence is rarely conclusive, it has to be 
explained and its sufficiency justified. This is performed using the CSCR, which 
documents an argument, based on the evidence, for why the system is considered to be 
safe for a given application in a given environment. 
3.2 SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 Implicit Safety Argument 
The aim of our study is to analyse the extent to which, by satisfying the risk management 
requirements of the SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 standards, organisations comply with a 
core, although currently implicit, risk-based argument that form the essence of the 
CSCR. This defines the theoretical proposition in this paper. We model this argument 
graphically in Figure 2, using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [29]. GSN is a widely 
used notation for the representation of safety arguments in the safety-critical domain, 
capturing the individual elements of the safety argument, e.g. claims, strategies, context 
and evidence, and the relationships that exist between these elements.  
Briefly, the chain of reasoning within the argument in Figure 2 is as follows: The top-level 
claim (HIT Safety) states that a HIT system is safe to use in a defined care setting. Both 
the description of the system and its setting, represented as GSN Context, should be 
generated from the Scope Definition activity in the risk management process in Figure 1. 
It is important to note that the scope of the argument is limited to HIT, which should 
contribute to a wider argument about the safety of the overall health services. This 
means that the scope of the HIT argument excludes certain types of risks, e.g. directly 
related to physical medical devices or drugs. The argument strategy (Risk Strategy) 
appeals to addressing the hazards and their associated risks as captured in the HL 
(captured as Context). This is consistent with the risk-based and hazard-driven approach 
promoted in SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 standards. Given that it is often infeasible to 
eliminate all risks, the argument makes a subsequent supporting claim that any 
remaining risk, i.e. residual after implementing any control measures, are managed and 
accepted. The term ÔacceptedÕ could be subject to different interpretations. The 
SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 standards give criteria for defining this term, namely that a 
residual risk is accepted if either it is within a predefined target (e.g. low/medium in a 
Clinical Risk Matrix) or the clinical benefits of the intended use outweigh the clinical risk 
(i.e. if further control is not practicable). This issue of risk-benefit analysis is a debatable 
and an ethically sensitive matter on which standards and legal systems have differed, 
i.e. similar to the discussion regarding the ÔAs Low As Reasonably PracticableÕ ALARP 
principle [48] [55]. In this particular case, the SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 standards are 
consistent with the medical devices safety standard ISO 14971 in allowing engineers 
and clinicians to determine, once all practicable control measures have been 
implemented, if a high risk can be accepted based on the clinical benefits that the 
technology can provide. For example, the technological safety risk posed during the 
transition period between an old and a new HIT, which might be high due to its impact 
on multiple services and patients, could be outweighed by the clinical benefits that result 
from the new system.  
The aim of this argument is primarily to make the structure of the HIT safety argument 
explicit [12], highlighting that HIT safety assurance should be treated in the same way as 
other clinical interventions by considering the extent to which the technology can lead to, 
or mitigate, patient safety risks in a particular care setting.  
 
  
Figure 2: Risk-based Argument Structure 
4 METHODS 
In this paper, we are interested in understanding practice. As such, a qualitative 
research approach, in the form of a case study, is best suited [32]. We favoured breadth 
over depth, i.e. we were interested in eliciting the perspectives of a larger number of 
stakeholders as opposed to in-depth experiences of a few. Therefore, we opted against 
an ethnographic research design (e.g. studying the application of the HIT safety 
standards in one particular project).  
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This topic would benefit from active discussion among study participants with different 
backgrounds (i.e. engineering and clinical). To this end, a focus group approach was 
deemed to provide the best fit. The focus groups were complemented by document 
analysis of CSCRs that are produced as part of the HIT safety assessment process. 
Document analysis is complementary in that it focused on the evidence, as documented 
and explained in the reports submitted for formal review to the Clinical Safety Group at 
NHS Digital, and as such can particularly help identify safety documentation challenges.  
Finally, in addition to reporting detailed and concrete findings, we are interested in 
identifying overarching safety assurance themes that cut across different types of HIT 
systems and healthcare settings. In order to achieve this, we used the Thematic 
Analysis methodology, based on the seminal work of Braun and Clarke [31], for 
supporting the systematic identification, analysis and reporting of patterns in qualitative 
data.  
Our study had the ethics approval from Physical Sciences Ethics Committee at the 
University of York. Our data collection and analysis methods are explained in more detail 
in the next two sections. 
4.1 Data Collection 
Three separate one-day workshops were organised by the Clinical Safety Team at NHS 
Digital in February and March 2016, involving different participants at each workshop 
(Figure 3). The participants, 34 in total, were purposefully selected and invited by the 
Clinical Safety Team at NHS Digital due to their expertise in the development, 
deployment and/or assessment of HIT and their understanding of both the engineering 
and clinical perspectives of the technology. As illustrated in Figure 3, they represented 
the three main parties involved in HIT risk management: NHS Digital (authority), health 
organisations (users) and HIT manufacturers (developers). The participants covered key 
roles primarily clinical safety officers, software engineers and safety assessors.  
 
Figure 3: Workshop Participants 
The workshops covered the core risk management activities in the SCCI0129 and 
SCCI0160 safety standards:  
¥ Scope Definition: do we understand the HIT system, both its design and use, 
within the intended health and/or social care setting? 
¥ Hazard identification: what are the potential sources of harm? 
¥ Risk Estimation: what are the likelihood and severity of the harm associated with 
the identified hazards?  
¥ Risk Control: if risks are not acceptable (i.e. given predefined risk thresholds or 
matrices), how are these controlled, e.g. through elimination and mitigation? 
¥ Risk Acceptability: how are decisions made, and by whom, concerning risk 
acceptability? 
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Each of these topics at each workshop was allocated 20 minutes and was discussed in 
groups of 5 participants [30]. Each round started and focused on one of the questions 
shown in Table 1, which correspond to our overall research question and safety 
argument and are derived from the Risk Management process in Figure 1. However, it is 
important to note that in order to manage the time allocated for each workshop (5 hours) 
we had to cluster the different topics under no more than 5 rounds. This meant that we 
included Risk Evaluation under the Risk Estimation Round (under two different 
questions). Further, given the importance of risk acceptance decisions, we created a 
separate round for this complex issue that required significant input particularly from the 
clinical participants. 
At the end of each round, members moved to new groups. Each group had a stable host 
who moderated the discussion. The role of the moderator was to ensure that the 
participants focused on the round question and encourage active engagement by all 
participants and record observations. Overall discussion sessions were scheduled to 
share insights with the larger group.  
Table 1: Discussion Questions 
Round 1: Scope Definition 
How is the HIT scope defined so that it is clear, correct and comprehensive? 
Round 2: Hazard Identification 
How is Hazard Identification performed so that the hazards identified are specific, relevant, clearly 
documented and ÒcompleteÓ? 
Round 3: Risk Estimation 
How is the risk classification framework calibrated so that it is appropriate to the system and 
environment? How are decisions concerning severity and likelihood made, scoped and justified? 
Round 4: Risk Control 
How are risk controls identified, ranked, verified and monitored?  
Round 5: Risk Acceptability 
How are safety risk acceptance decisions made and justified? Who is responsible for making and 
approving these decisions?  
 
The workshops were followed by detailed reviews of the CSCRs for 20 HIT systems, 
covering primary and secondly care, following the same questions listed in Table 1. The 
CSCRs were selected by the Clinical Safety Team at NHS Digital as a representative 
sample of the CSCRs that they had reviewed in the last 5 years. The CSCR reviews 
were used to corroborate and augment the data collected at the workshops. The review 
team comprised 5 safety experts from the Clinical Safety Team at NHS Digital. The 
document analysis is treated as a secondary source of data. Each CSCR was reviewed 
by one member of the team, with experience and competency in both safety and HIT.  
The CSCRs considered diverse functions, including: 
¥ Electronic prescribing  
¥ Electronic health records 
¥ Patient demographics  
¥ Booking and referral  
¥ Care planning 
¥ Maternity care management 
¥ Emergency care management 
¥ Bed management 
¥ Health data middleware 
The CSCRs were submitted by health organisations (for specific deployments), 
manufacturers (for type approval) and NHS Digital (for the national infrastructure).  
The workshop participants and moderators and the CSCR reviewers recorded their 
observations and comments in written summary notes, against the questions in Table 1, 
and were asked to note the organisational, clinical, human, technological and technical 
factors relevant for each of the risk management topics.  
4.2 Data Analysis 
The written summary notes were imported into NVivo11 for analysis. The text was coded 
following an iterative process and analysed using Thematic Analysis [31-32], 
determining and interpreting repeated patterns of meaning in the data set. The coding 
was theory-driven, based on how the SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 safety standards expect 
the clinicians and engineers to justify HIT risks, i.e. following the implicit risk-based 
argument in Figure 2. 
The initial codes corresponded to the inputs to, and outputs from, the risk management 
activities. These inputs and outputs represent hypothetical weaknesses [25], combined 
with organisational factors [8], which have the potential to undermine the implicit risk-
based argument (Figure 2). This was used to ensure the coding of specific weaknesses 
and strengths in intermediate stages (e.g. poor understanding of clinical context) and not 
just in the outcome (e.g. inappropriate classification of risks). The final phase involved 
combining the different codes into overarching themes using a thematic map.  
5 RESULTS 
Four themes that cut across the different HIT risk management activities were identified, 
representing two areas of strength: establishment of a systematic approach to risk 
management and close engagement by clinicians; and two areas for improvement: the 
need for greater depth and clarity in risk management practices and more organisational 
support for assuring safety.  
These themes are summarised in Table 2. The data indicates that the assurance 
framework established through the SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 standards has provided a 
principled approach to risk management, building on best practice in system safety. In 
particular, these standards are based on, and informed by, principles of system safety 
management in safety-critical industries, most notably the UK Defence Standard 00:56 
[58]. The role of the clinicians, particularly the CSOs, has been recognised by the 
different organisations. Most of the safety analyses are clinically-led, with representation 
from multidisciplinary teams. However, concerns exist about the rigour, detail and clarity 
of the HIT safety evidence. The identified HIT hazards, and their associated risks and 
controls, are rarely specific to the system and the clinical environment, or justified in 
sufficient detail, to enable the stakeholders to evaluate and, where necessary, challenge 
the safety beliefs about the system. Further, organisational support for safety is 
fundamental, particularly with regard to making sufficient resources available for 
implementing the HIT risk management process. Unfortunately, these resources are 
seldom provided. Where they exist, such resources are typically used to confirm, rather 
than assess, the acceptability of the risk posed by the system. Risk analysis is also 
commonly performed late in the lifecycle. This often weakens the credibility of the 
evidence and its ability to influence the deployment of the system.  
Table 3 provides a detailed summary of the specific safety assurance factors that were 
identified by our data analysis, which trace to one or more of the themes in Table 2. 
These factors are categorised as either technical or social and they are described 
against the particular HIT risk management activity to which they relate. Table 3 also 
lists specific recommendations that were made by the workshop participants. In the rest 
of this section, these factors and recommendations are examined in more detail and are 
illustrated through examples provided by the workshop participants. 
Table 2: Summary of Themes, Representing Areas of Strength and Improvement 
 Theme        Examples 
Strengths 
 
Risk-based: current approach provides a systematic process and a common 
language for identifying and analysing the risks of hazardous HIT failures, combined 
with the requirements for organisational commitment. 
− Wide-scale use of HLs and CSCRs; 
− CSCRs cover HIT-related hazards, risk estimation, available 
controls and acceptance statements. 
Clinical engagement: there has been a recognition of the significant role of clinicians, 
particularly CSOs, during HIT risk management and approval. 
− CSOs taking a leading role within health organisations, 
manufacturers and NHS DIGITAL; 
− CSO advice is now regarded as necessary for HIT approval. 
Improvements Depth of evidence: safety evidence tends to be generic and requires more explicit 
clinical and engineering justification in the context of the deploying health 
organisations.  
− Risk estimation lacking empirical data, relevant to the clinical 
environment; 
− Insufficient clarity about the effectiveness of risk controls. 
Organisational support: level of organisational funding and commitment does not 
seem to be proportionate to the safety criticality of HIT, particularly within health 
organisations. 
− Risk analysis performed as a late activity, purely for 
compliance reasons, as a tick-box exercise;  
− Lack of clarity about responsibilities and authorities. 
 
  
  Table 3: Summary of Safety Assurance Factors 
Topic Summary of Findings Recommendations (Made By Participants) 
Scope 
Definition 
T1
1
: Great variation in the level of detail and clarity for specifying the HIT system and its clinical environment; 
T2: No consensus on key terms: Ôclinical scopeÕ, Ôintended useÕ and Ôoperational environmentÕ; 
S1
2
: Good engagement by clinicians though often depends on availability rather than expertise; 
S2: Authorship bias: clinicians (contextual) vs engineers (technical); 
T3: Insufficient consideration of variation in practice in clinical environment and impact of local HIT configurations; 
T4: Lack of detailed information on integration and interfaces with external systems. 
 R1: Modelling notations needed for integrating clinical and 
engineering perspectives; 
 R2: Clear definitions to be included in the standards; 
 R3: More coverage required for different configurations and 
clinical settings;  
 R4: More emphasis on interoperability requirements. 
 
Hazard 
Identification 
 
T5: Confusion about the terms hazard, risk, harm and quality issues; 
T6: Difficulty of positioning hazardous failures of HIT within care processes;  
T7: Hazards too detailed to reflect potential harm to patients; 
T8: Hazards very generic and poorly linked to clinical environment; 
S3: Hazards identified by manufactures lacking validation for their relevance by deploying health organisations; 
S4: Lack of early engagement in, and funding for, hazard identification; 
S5: Perception of hazard identification as a tick box exercise. 
 R5: Publish anonymised Hazard Logs for HIT and known 
hazards of care within the NHS; 
 R6: Develop practical guidance on hazard identification 
workshops and techniques; 
 R7: Develop guidance on the necessary clinical and engineering 
expertise needed for hazard identification. 
 
Risk Estimation T9: Two main risk matrices used: NHS NPSA and NHS Digital, with medium region leading to most confusion; 
T10: Too much customisation leading to complication in risk communication, rating and comparison; 
T11: Insufficient historical data to generate empirical estimate of severity and likelihood; 
T12: Risk parameters estimated qualitatively and subjectively, e.g. expert judgement; 
S6: Expert judgement not provided with clear justification; 
S7: Hazards biased based on clinical representation (of different specialities); 
T13: Risk overestimation as a result of confusing likelihood of hazard and likelihood of resulting patient harm; 
S8: Risk classification sometimes performed retrospectively; 
T14: Insufficient consideration of demographics and patient variation. 
 R8: Implementation of a consensus risk estimation framework is 
needed to ensure consistency and promote learning; 
 R9: Stressing the importance of customising standard risk 
matrices to suit local environments;   
 R10: Greater explanation and justification needed for severity 
and likelihood parameters. 
 
Risk Control T15: System re-design most desirable (removing source of hazard or carefully implementing alerts); 
S9: Training and appealing to clinical expertise most common; 
S10: Training generally regarded as a weak (and too generic) risk control; 
T16: Choice of control depends on phase: redesign during development and workarounds after deployment; 
S11: Alert fatigue regarded as a source of concern; 
S12: Concerns about lack of documentation, traceability and assessment of changes in risk controls; 
T17: Lack of explicit evidence and feedback about the effectiveness and suitability of risk controls. 
 R11: Importance of diversity and balance in risk control types; 
 R12: Appealing to vigilance by clinicians should depend on 
detectability; 
 R13: Training to be specific, justified and on-going; 
 R14: Proactive monitoring of, and feedback on, workarounds 
and design changes.  
Risk 
Acceptance 
T18: Lack of documented clinical justification and technical explanation for risk acceptance; 
T19: Rare use of the ÔAs Low As Reasonably PracticableÕ (ALARP) principle;  
S13: No clearly established accountability and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in risk acceptance decisions 
(senior management and CSOs); 
S14: Clear emphasis on professional registration and judgement of clinicians.  
 R15: Define more clearly the roles, responsibilities, authority 
and resources within both manufacturers and health 
organisations; 
 R16: Greater emphasis on interpretation and justification of 
acceptance decisions. 
 
                                                
1
 ÔTÕ indicates a ÔTechnicalÕ factor. 
2
 ÔSÕ indicates a ÔSocialÕ factor. 
 5.1 HIT Scope Definition  
The Scope Definition covers the HIT functionality and clinical setting. The workshop 
participants indicated that it is often the hardest part of the process. The majority of the 
CSCRs reviewed lacked a detailed description of the HIT systems and their clinical 
context. This is attributed to factors that relate to the terminology used in the safety 
standards, the complex nature of HIT systems and the variable nature of the clinical 
settings. 
Firstly, the terminology itself is problematic. Engineers and clinicians have different 
interpretations of the terms Ôclinical scopeÕ, Ôintended useÕ and Ôoperational environmentÕ. 
The current standards define some of these terms but not to the extent necessary to 
resolve the different interpretations.  
Secondly, while the engagement between clinical and engineering teams is improving, 
there are some concerns as to whether the right people with the necessary skills and 
experience, including front-line clinical, are involved in the HIT risk management process 
as opposed to merely those who are keen to engage.  
Thirdly, there is a general agreement that the system and its intended use are not 
described to the depth and clarity necessary to complete the subsequent safety analysis 
activities. Authorship bias of the document is a key factor. Clinicians tend to focus on 
high-level usage whereas engineers consider the more technical design. Unified 
notations, bridging the gaps between the clinical and engineering perspectives, appear 
to be needed.  
Finally, current practices do not seem to cope with the high degree of variability in the 
clinical environment and with the bespoke system configurations. One senior clinical 
participant expressed this as an inherent characteristic of healthcare: Òif you ask 24 
clinicians about e-prescribing youÕll get 24 different answersÓ. This is often exacerbated 
by the emergent behaviours resulting from the complex interconnectivity and 
interoperability between the various HIT systems, including interfaces with external 
social care and national systems. 
5.2 Hazard Identification 
The workshop participants highlighted that the notion of hazard is not familiar within 
healthcare settings. It is seen as an engineering rather than clinical concept. The term 
risk is more recognisable by clinicians, as expressed by one participant: Òthe NHS has 
always worked in the ÔrisksÕ: don't know what a hazard isÓ. The overwhelming majority of 
hazards are care hazards, which predate the deployment of HIT and to which the 
technology now contributes, e.g. patient misidentification. Positioning the specific 
hazardous failures of HIT within the care process is seen as a difficult task.  
Firstly, deciding on the level of granularity for hazard identification is problematic. On the 
one hand, many of the identified HIT hazards are too detailed and correspond to 
technical failures (i.e. Ônetwork unavailabilityÕ). As such, they do not reflect the potential 
harm to patients. On the other hand, other hazards are defined generically, with little 
information about the context, to make them relevant to the clinical environment (e.g. 
Ôwrong prescriptionÕ). In part, this can be complicated by a poorly-defined scope, as 
illustrated by one participant: Òan important distinction needed to be made between 
hazards caused by system and hazards caused by clinical activity. Can the system lead 
to patient harm or was the patient harm already there but the system perpetuates it?Ó It 
was noted that many of the events flagged by engineers as hazards were treated as 
quality issues by clinicians, i.e. events that commonly occur and from which recovery is 
expected, e.g.  Ôdelay in providing careÕ.  
Secondly, where do hazards come from? A common scenario has been to take the HL 
generated by the manufacturers and instantiate it to fit within the specific clinical context 
of the health organisations. The perception here is that the manufacturers are more 
competent and have the resources to produce the HL to the required quality. The 
potential consequence, however, is that health organisations adopt the HL without the 
adaptation necessary to cater for the specific local clinical requirements. This is, in part, 
due to lack of early engagement as highlighted by one participant: ÒPoor quality is due to 
many reasons including doing the work last minute, Ôas something that needs to be 
doneÕ, a tick box exercise. It is usually left to the clinician assigned rather than done in 
plenty of time with a multidisciplinary team. The hazards are generic, often lifted from 
other documentsÓ. Some highlighted the lack of resources as the primary contributor: Òa 
continuing message is that there is no funding and resources provided to the NHS to 
deal with these issuesÓ. 
Finally, to ensure consistency and promote learning, some participants (particularly 
safety assessors) emphasised the need to Òpublish anonymised hazard logs for HIT and 
known hazards of care within the NHSÓ, combined with Òpractical guidance on Hazard 
Identification workshops and techniquesÓ. That is, for HIT functions that tend to be 
common in many clinical settings, e.g. as part of electronic prescribing or patient 
administration systems, there is a need for the HIT safety community to collectively 
identify and make available common hazards that are associated with the use of these 
functions, supported by guidance on how to analyse the risk of these hazards based on 
the specific characteristics of the HIT system and its clinical settings.  
5.3 Clinical Risk Estimation  
Two risk classification matrices are mainly adopted, namely the ones provided by the 
National Patient Safety Agency [34] and NHS Digital [35-36]. Views vary about the 
suitability of these matrices, ranging from treating them as the Òleast understoodÓ to 
highlighting problems with specific parts, e.g. Òmedium region is hard to deal with; too 
wideÓ. Many participants highlighted the importance of adaptation: Ònever one size fits 
allÓ and Òkey is understand oneÕs own matrixÓ. However, too much adaptation can make 
it difficult to communicate and compare risks between organisations, particularly in the 
event of incidents, e.g. inconsistent risk ratings of the same hazardous condition 
between the manufacturer, health organisation and NHS Digital. Participants recognised 
the Òpotential for implementing a consensusÕ frameworkÓ to aid risk communication, help 
ensure consistency and promote learning at the national level. 
When using the risk matrices, it was observed that there is insufficient historical or 
experimental data to generate an empirical estimate of the severity and likelihood 
parameters. One participant attributed this to Òdata for old systems not found or 
generalisableÓ. Each deployment of the technology is seen as novel, intended to cater 
for the local clinical requirements. As expressed by one participant, there is Òno 
denominator for likelihood in most casesÓ. As such, subjectivity is seen as inevitable; the 
risk parameters are estimated qualitatively based predominantly on expert judgment. For 
some analysts, the lack of precision is not regarded as a problem: Òmain reason should 
be to compare the relative importance of the different risks rather than to be preciseÓ. 
However, as indicated in the earlier discussion, for this to be effective in communicating 
the level of risk posed by HIT, common or consistent risk matrices are necessary. 
At a more detailed level, some recurring misconceptions were highlighted. Firstly, it was 
observed that many risks were overestimated as a result of confusing the likelihood of 
the hazard and that of the associated patient harm. According to the SCCI0129 and 
SCCI0160 standards, the likelihood parameter of a clinical risk is associated with the 
occurrence of harm. For example, the likelihood of a late e-prescription might be medium 
but the likelihood of any resulting patient harm might be very low due to the availability of 
a backup paper-based system. Secondly, the consideration of exposure and population 
size is often unclear in the risk estimates. Current risk estimates do not cater for 
differences in demographics and patient variables. For example, a large population with 
high-risk co-morbidities is a significant factor that could influence the severity of HIT 
hazards, i.e. delays in data communication between primary and secondary care 
organisations can lead to severe complications that might be easier to control in smaller 
communities. As such, patient demographics and social contexts have to be explicitly 
specified in the HIT Scope Definition. Thirdly, concerns were raised about instances 
where risk classification was performed retrospectively, as expressed by one participant: 
Òoften start with idea of risk rating then look at severity and likelihood as validationÓ. This 
can be attributed to treating risk analysis as an afterthought: Òback documentation 
exercise rather than at current phase in lifecycleÓ. Finally, the need Òfor greater 
explanation and justification in risk assessmentÓ, i.e. expert justification, was highlighted 
both in the workshop and reviews. It was acknowledged that expert judgement is 
important but should be combined with a clear justification in order to address potential 
bias Òbased on clinical representationÓ, especially in cases where front-line clinical users 
from different disciplines with different risk profiles are under-represented. 
5.4 Clinical Risk Controls 
When risks are deemed unacceptable (i.e. given predefined risk thresholds or matrices), 
the consideration of further risk reduction is necessary. This ranges from system 
controls, e.g. re-design and testing, to organisational measures, e.g. process change 
and training. System redesign is recognised as the most desirable. Training, and 
appealing to clinical expertise, is highlighted as the most common.  
Firstly, diversity and balance in the types of risk controls are seen as necessary. 
Redesigns are more likely to be feasible early in the development phase as highlighted 
by one participant: Òdesign is a stronger control as you are getting the error outÓ. 
Redesign takes different forms from removing the source of the hazards to implementing 
alerts, although alert fatigue was acknowledged as a source of concern. After 
deployment, workarounds are common. As expressed by one participant, Òusers used 
the system beyond their intended use or had workarounds, which again increased risk 
and not something that could be controlled and tested for prior to implementationÓ. It is 
acknowledged that many workarounds are deployed for the right reasons, i.e. to mitigate 
new risks that are not explicitly considered in the CSCR. 
However, the problem lies in the lack of traceability, monitoring and assessment of 
workarounds: Òoften the answer is Ôrefer to business processÕ without stating what the 
business processes areÓ. That is, the opportunity to learn from, and improve based on, 
these workarounds is often lost. 
Secondly, although training is seen as a weak risk control, it is heavily relied upon. The 
effectiveness of training is ÒvariableÓ. Claims about training have to be specific: Òthe user 
is trained to do x and yÓ. The content of the training has to be justified. On-going training 
is required and should be Òwidened to all users and not just select users for testing or 
acceptanceÓ as articulated by one participant. 
Finally, closely linked with training is the role of clinicians as risk controls. Some 
participants emphasised the need for clinicians, as highly qualified professionals, to 
retain ÒawarenessÓ, ÒresponsibilityÓ and ÒaccountabilityÓ. However, many expressed 
concerns about over-relying on clinicians to compensate for poor system design. 
Appealing to vigilance by clinicians should depend on detectability, i.e. given the 
workload and time constraints, is it reasonable for a clinician to notice and recover from 
the hazardous HIT failure? One clinical participant expressed this as follows: ÒitÕs easy in 
case of obviously wrong results or lack of system availability but harder in cases where 
the results are wrong but plausibleÓ. Extracting evidence about the effectiveness of the 
risk controls, based on actual data, continues to be a challenge. 
5.5 Clinical Risk Acceptance 
The HIT safety evidence generated from the risk management activities is rarely 
conclusive. Risk decisions require interpretation and justification by those responsible for 
making them. However, there is a concern that such justification and the detailed clinical 
and technical explanation are rarely documented. 
In the majority of the cases, the criteria against which the decisions are made tend to 
appeal to the risk classification matrix, e.g. lack of any risks rated as high. The principle 
that the risks should be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is mentioned [37]. 
However, the use of this principle, particularly in cases where it is believed that the 
clinical benefits outweigh the residual clinical risk, remain rare and tend to be qualitative, 
i.e. no statistical basis for comparing costs and clinical benefits. 
Further, there is no consensus on the parties responsible for making and approving the 
risk acceptance decisions. Senior managers are highlighted as ultimately accountable. 
However, given that they are remotely involved in the HIT safety analysis, the basis on 
which senior management approves the systems is unclear. As expressed by one 
participant: Òit is signed-off by top management though it is not clear what process and 
who has ultimately signed-offÓ. The size, cost and criticality of the system are key 
factors. Small-scale systems are typically approved by senior clinicians and rarely by the 
CEO. Clear responsibilities are also difficult to identify, given Òthe culture within the NHS 
with changes all the timeÓ, e.g. changes due to organisational restructuring by merging 
different hospital services or units. 
More commonly, senior management approval relies on the advice given by the CSOs 
from the health organisation and the manufacture. One participant highlighted that 
ÒCSOs have a key role in translating evidence and advising top managementÓ. This was 
clearly the case in most of the CSCRs reviewed. The professional registration of the 
CSOs reinforces competency and accountability. This is particularly important where 
there are cost and safety tradeoffs, as indicated by one participant: Òthe important thing 
was to ensure that clinical justification overrides any other justification such as financialÓ.  
6 DISCUSSION 
Our original proposition was that by satisfying the risk management requirements of the 
SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 safety standards, clinicians and engineers complied with the 
implicit risk-based argument depicted in Figure 2. Our analysis of the data collected from 
the workshops and CSCR reviews indicates that the degree of detail and clarity in the 
HIT safety evidence is often insufficient to determine the extent to which this risk-based 
argument is supported. The problem lies in the way in which the risk management 
activities are implemented rather than in the argument itself. As highlighted through the 
recommendations in Table 3, Clinicians, engineers and assessors need practical means 
by which they determine if the evidence is rigorous, detailed and clear, given the risk 
posed by the system. This is a key area for improvement. 
In Figure 4, we revisit the risk-based argument and annotate the different elements with 
specific recommendations, which were extracted from the data collected (as 
summarised in Table 3). For example, defining the HIT system and its environment 
clearly and concisely, taking into consideration variability in clinical practice, is 
fundamental and is highlighted in the ÔScope DefinitionÕ results presented in Table 3. The 
HIT safety evidence generated from risk analysis can easily be undermined due to a 
poor understanding of the systems and their care settings. Further, as indicated in Table 
3 and illustrated in the annotated argument in Figure 4, the rationale for deciding on the 
likelihood and severity parameters for each risk should be more explicitly communicated. 
It is important to note that the risk-based argument should not be seen as a static 
artefact [38-39]. Continuously updating the CSCRs, based on feedback from end-users, 
is essential, particularly given the common use of workarounds. Otherwise, gaps 
between the documented evidence and the actual safety of the HIT system might lead to 
Òa culture of Ôpaper safetyÕ at the expense of real safetyÓ [40]. 
  
Figure 4: Risk-based Argument Pattern, Annotated with Areas for Improvement 
Health organisations face challenges in terms of securing the necessary resources, 
particularly when addressing the HIT risk management requirements for the first time. As 
such, the risk-based argument cannot be seen in isolation of an organisational 
argument. In Figure 5, we sketch an example fragment of such an organisational 
argument, with four claims that have to be developed, and substantiated with evidence, 
concerning the level and the quality of support provided by the organisation. Such 
evidence, concerning the availability of resources, including a dedicated CSO, the 
competency of those performing the risk analysis and the safety culture within the 
organisation, could then be scrutinised to assess as to whether the organisational 
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support is proportionate to the scale, complexity and safety risk associated with the HIT 
system. This is an important issue that was highlighted in the recommendations in Table 
3 (see R15). Weaknesses in this organisational argument could undermine confidence in 
the primary risk-based argument, e.g. a poor safety culture would undermine the 
credibility of the safety evidence captured in the Hazard Log. 
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Figure 5: Organisational Argument 
Further, the lack of publically available examples of HLs and CSCRs for HIT represents 
a significant deficit in the literature. Many of the HIT safety concepts, e.g. hazards and 
risk controls, could remain abstract unless they are related to, and illustrated using, 
specific health and social care settings and HIT functionality. As such, more practical 
HIT-specific safety guidelines and detailed examples are needed, and evaluated in 
different care settings [41], in order to clarify the significance of the HIT risk management 
and identify the necessary organisational commitments. 
From the HIT safety literatureÕs perspective, this study provides further evidence 
concerning the importance of treating HIT safety assurance as a socio-technical 
process, involving both clinical and engineering stakeholders [6] [8]. Although the data 
highlights concerns about the lack of sufficient funding and safety culture, it also 
highlights conceptual challenges regarding the implementation of systems and safety 
engineering techniques in healthcare settings [9]. This was exemplified in the difficulty of 
modelling the HIT system given the variable nature of clinical settings; a significant issue 
that has been highlighted in the patient safety literature [45] [7]. The current literature on 
Resilience Engineering [39] and Safety 2.0 [56] [57] emphasise the need to redefine the 
notion of variability. This is in order to help distinguish between, on the one hand, unsafe 
violations and, on the other hand, desirable performance adjustments that are necessary 
to ensure the ability of the system to maintain safety, given changing demands and 
disturbances. The Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS 2.0) [45] also 
now more explicitly considers variability through the concepts of configuration and 
adaptation. 
Another key conceptual challenge relates to the difficulty of resolving the different 
interpretations of the notion of hazards and risk classification schemes for HIT and how 
they relate to hazards and risks at the health service level. That is, it is important to 
explore and evaluate more explicitly the relationship between a HIT safety case and the 
overall safety case for a hospital, of which the HIT safety issues are one of many 
important, and sometimes competing, factors.  
Finally, in making the case for HIT, the decision-making process would benefit from the 
rigour that Health Technology Assessment (HTA) [52] could bring, i.e. similar to the 
application of HTA to other healthcare interventions, e.g. for medical procedures and 
drugs, in which different types of clinical, social, economic, and organisational risks and 
benefits are compared and analysed [53]. That is, HTA and safety risk management can 
be seen as complementary. On the one hand, HTA is used to inform policy decisions by 
searching for actual evidence of effectiveness and complementing this with an economic 
evaluation, i.e. ensuring that funds are allocated in the best possible way. On the other 
hand, safety risk management is used to identify potential hazards and risks and analyse 
means of managing the uncertainty with the HIT design and use. As such, HTA can 
inform HIT safety decisions, because it can provide concrete evidence of effectiveness, 
and the rigorous evaluation designs (e.g. Randomised Controlled Trials) can provide 
useful insights for the risk management process. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Knowledge in patient safety tends to move in three phases [42]: Ôsuperficial simplicityÕ 
(e.g. emulation of safety practices in aviation), followed by Ôconfusing complexityÕ (e.g. 
unique healthcare characteristics and assumptions emerge and challenge the 
effectiveness of the new approaches) and ultimately Ôprofound simplicityÕ (e.g. open 
safety culture is seen as a foundational aspect). Current HIT safety practices in England 
are in the second phase. Adopting a systematic approach to risk management, building 
on best practice in system safety, has been beneficial. Much of the benefit has been 
realised due to the close engagement by the clinicians. However, despite such progress, 
more work remains in order to mature current safety assurance practices and improve 
organisational support. Significant effort is still needed to develop and evaluate practical 
techniques and tools, in different health and social care settings, that help clinicians and 
engineers generate and explain the HIT safety evidence to the required level of rigour, 
detail and clarity. 
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